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OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
L. JACK GRAHAM, • • 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
OF UTAH, R. THORNE FOUNDATION : 
and STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendant-Appellee, 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Supreme Court No. 18363 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal f rorn an order of the Industrial 
Commission confirming the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law of the Administrative Law Judge. 
PISPOSITION BY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the plaintiff, 
L. Jack Graham, was an independent contractor and therefore not 
entitled to receive worker's compensation benefits from R. Thorne 
Foundation and its insurance carrier, The State Insurance Fund. 
The Administrative Law Judge, Keith E. Sohm, entered his Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on January 21, 1982. The 
Industrial Commission of Utah affirmed the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order and denied of the plaintiff's Motion 
for Review on March 9, 1982. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellee is asking this court to affirm the 
Order of the Industrial Cornmissione 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about November 8, 1980, plaintiff Graham ("plaintiff") 
contacted R. Thorne, owner of defendant corporation (hereinafter 
jointly and severally "defendant") offering to shingle roofs 
on homes defendant was constructing. (R. 13) Plaintiff and defendant 
entered into an informal telephone agreement whereby plaintiff 
agreed to shingle houses for a fee between $6.50 and $8.00 per 
square. (R. 14) 
Plaintiff has been involved in the roofing business, 
in some capacity, for 41 years (R. 11). During that period of 
time, he has developed certain techniques in roofing. For instance, 
plaintiff uses strip flashing on a roof as opposed to normal 
continuous flashing procedures. (R. 18) Plaintiff used these 
techniques on defendant's homes even though these techniques 
were not normally followed on the homes constructed by defendant. 
(R. 18) 
During November and December of 1980 and January and 
February of 1981, plaintiff periodically shingled houses for 
defendant. (R. 12, 54) Plaintiff billed defendant on a monthly 
basis for homes on which he had completed the roofing. (R. 20) 
Throughout plaintiff's contractual relationship with defendant, 
plaintiff "was given some latitude in decision making." (R. 37) 
Plaintiff used all his own tools (R. 63) and worked on his own 
time schedule. (R. 61) Defendant never instructed plaintiff 
as to when or how to do the work. (R. 74) Defendant himself 
knows very little about roofing. (R.73) On only one occasion, 
2 
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plaintiff did accornodate defendant by beginning work on a roof 
before the roofing on another house had been completed. (R. 28) 
Defendant did not deduct social security or withholding taxes 
from plaintiff's checks. (R. 36) Defendant informed plaintiff 
he was not covered by insurance. (R. 56, 77) On occasion, plaintiff 
hired others to help him do the shingling on the defendant's 
homes. (R. 25,26,57) During this period, plaintiff worked for 
three other contractors. (R. 52) During January, 1980, plaintiff 
worked only three days on homes being constructed by defendant 
and worked the rest of the month for other contractors. (R. 55) 
Plaintiff was injured in two separate accidents while 
working on defendant's homes. On November 25, 1980, defendant 
slipped while carrying a bundle of shingles up the ladder. (R. 99) 
His son took him to .the Valley West Emergency Room where it was 
determined that plaintiff had sustained minor wrist and shoulder 
injuries. (R. 99) On February 6, 1981, plaintiff slipped on 
some ice causing him to fall off the building on which he was 
working. Plaintiff incurred various injuries in this fall, including 
a fractured wrist, pelvis and hip. (R. 99) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FINDING OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE, 
UPHELD BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AND, 
THEREFORE, NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER WORKER'S 
COMPENSATION WAS WITHIN THE COMMISSION'S 
DISCRETION AND SHOULD NOT BE REVERSED BY THIS 
COURT. 
It is well settled law that this Court should reverse 
3 
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the Industrial Commission's findings only if they are arbitrary 
and capricious or completely without support in the record. 
In Jones v. Ogden Auto Body, 646 P.2d 703 (Utah 1982), this court 
reasserted the standard of review set forth in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. 
Manfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah i981), and affirmed the Commission's 
order: 
••• This court's function in reviewing the 
Commission's findings is a strictly limited one in 
which the question is not whether the court agrees 
with the Commission's findings or whether they are 
supported by the preponderance of the evidence. 
Instead, the reviewing court inquiry is whether the 
Commission's findings are narbitrary or capriciousn 
or "wholly without cause" or contrary to the "one 
(inevitable) conclusion from the evidence" or without 
any substantial evidence to support them. Only then 
should the Commission's findings be displaced. 
ll. at 890. 
The Comission's findings in the instant case do not 
fall under any of the exceptions and, therefore, should not be 
reversed. The findings, based on a complete evidentiary hearing 
before the Administrative Law Judge are not arbitrary and capricious. 
Nor were the findings "wholly without cause" or contrary to the 
"one inevitable conclusion from the evidence" or without "any 
substantial evidence to support them." The record is replete 
with decision making procedures, and other matters which provide 
a wholly rational basis for the findings of the Administrative 
Law Judge affirmed by the Commission. In his Findings of Fact 
the Administrative Law Judge pointed to some of the evidence 
upon which he based his conclusion: 
Doing piece work as a carpenter, the applicant 
usually was paid by the hour with no deductions, 
4 
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but when doing roof work he was paid by the square 
with no deductions being taken out for taxes or 
social security. The applicant worked on his own 
schedule, sometimes working on one house and some-
times working on another house and sometimes working 
on other jobs and then returning to the Thorne 
Construction job. If the applicant could not do 
some of the work he would hire someone to do it. 
He had his son and other helpers on the job, he 
supervised their work though they usually had 
their own tools. At the same time he was working 
on the Thorne Construction job he was also working 
on other jobs for other contractors at the same 
time, going to and from the jobs at his own 
discretion. The other companies did not withhold 
social security or income taxes either. Thorne 
Construction allowed the applicant to order supplies 
on occassion because his computation was more accurate 
because he knew exactly how much more work was to be 
done. Mr. Thorne had informed the applicant that he 
was not covered by workmen's compensation benefits. 
(R. 99) 
The record demonstrates that the findings approved 
by the Commission were not arbitrary, capricious or without support 
and, therefore, this court should affirm the Comission's order. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE WORK DONE BY THE PLAINTIFF WAS WORK 
PERFORMED IN THE USUAL COURSE OF DEFENDANT'S 
BUSINESS, THAT FACT ALONE IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
QUALIFY PLAINTIFF AS AN EMPLOYEE UNDER UTAH 
CODE ANN. SECTION 35-1-42 (1953 AS AMENDED). 
As plaintiff's brief, at Point I, explains, the issue 
in this case depends upon application of Utah Code Ann. Section 
35-1-42. That statute defines the terms "employee" and "independent 
contractor." Employees are entitled to recover worker's compensation 
benefits from their employers. Independent contractors are not 
entitled to worker's compensation benefits. The relevant portion 
of that statute follows: 
5 
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Where any employer procures any work to be done 
wholly or in part for him by a contractor oyer 
whose work he retains supervision or control. and 
such work is a part or process in the trade or 
business of the employer, said contractor, and 
all persons employed by him, and all subcontractors 
under him, and all persons employed by any such 
subcontractors, shall be deemed, within the meaning 
of this section, employees of such original employer. 
(emphasis added) 
This section clearly states that the contractor must 
retain supervision and control over the work and the work must 
be performed in the usual course of the -contractor's business. 
Since defendant did not retain supervision or control over plain-
tiff's work, it is irrelevant whether the work performed by the 
plaintiff was work that was a part or process in the trade or 
business of defendant. The Administrative Law Judge did not 
need to address this issue since he clearly based his decision 
on those facts in the record which demonstrated defendant did 
not retain supervision or control over the plaintiff's work. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT DID NOT RETAIN SUPERVISION OR CONTROL 
OVER PLAINTIFF'S WORK WITHIN THE MEANING OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. SECTION 35-1-42. 
The evidence established before the Administrative 
Law Judge mandated a finding that the defendant did not exercise 
control over plaintiff's work. _The plaintiff worked on his own 
time schedule, employed by his own techniques, used his own tools, 
billed defendant monthly on completed houses, and, on occassion, 
employed others to work for him. Moreover, defendant did not 
6 
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deduct social security or withholding from plaintiff's checks 
and he informed the plaintiff that he was not covered by worker's 
compensation. 
Plaintiff, in his brief, relies on various facts to 
assert that defendant exercised control or, at least, retained 
the right to control plaintiff's work. These facts do not establish 
control or the right to control. For instance, the plaintiff 
relies on the fact that the defendant could terminate the relationship 
at will. This is totally irrelevant to the issue of control. 
Certainly plaintiff also could have terminated the relationship 
at will. Plaintiff relies on a few particular incidences when 
he and defendant worked together on procedural problems, such 
as timing, to argue that defendant exercised control. These 
facts (plaintiff's brief p. 3-4) do not demonstrate any real 
degree of control on defendant's part but merely suggest that 
defendant and plaintiff worked together to complete the project 
according to defendant's design. 
Throughout his brief, plaintiff suggests that defendant 
classified plaintiff as an independent contractor merely to avoid 
liability and, therefore, plaintiff is entitled to worker's compen-
sation benefits. In Harry L. Youna & Sons Inc .• v. Industrial 
Commission, 538 P.2d 316 (Utah 1975), cited by plaintiff, this 
court, relying partially on the employer's intent to avoid insurance 
liability, held that the worker was an "employee" entitled to 
worker's compensation benefits. There is no evidence in this 
case indicating that defendant intentionally structured his business 
7 
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to avoid insurance liability. Moreover, the crucial factor in 
Young was the high degree of control the employer exercised over 
the worker. This court, in Young. utilized a two prong test 
to determine the status of the workers. First, the employer's 
major concern in the structuring of the work relationship must 
be the avoidance of liability and, secondly, the employer must 
exercise control over the work. In Young the Commission found 
not only an intent to avoid insurance liability but also a substantial 
degree of control. This court upheld the findings of the Commission, 
stating: 
This is one of the frequently encountered cases 
which justifies the view taken by the Commission 
that the employer wanted the 'best of two worlds,' 
On the one hand, to have a person rendering a 
service ayer whom he can maintain a high degree of 
control; and at the same time to avoid the responsibility 
that he would have to an employee. (emphasis added) 
~. at 317. 
In the instant case, neither the requirement of control nor the 
requirement of an intent to avoid liability has been met. The 
defendant did not maintain control or the right to control nor 
Defendant's purpose in structuring his business in 
the manner he does is not to avoid Worker's Compensation liability 
to employees. Plaintiff cites· from the record to support such 
an allegation. That citation, which follows, is incomplete: 
A. I have employees that are general maintenance 
type people, that run errands and do miscellaneous 
things. 
Q. And maybe a bookeeper, office people, or something 
like this? 
A. Yes. 
8 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. But all the work in connection with your homes, 
in construction itself is all contracted out? 
A. That's correct. 99% 
Q. Then what is the consideration? 
A. The consideration is that it is just a matter 
of liability ••• 
(Plaintiff's brief at 6-7) 
Defendant believes a more extensive citation will reveal that 
the defendant's purpose was not to avoid liability for insurance 
or taxes. 
A. I have employees that are general maintenance-type 
people, that run errands and do miscellaneous 
things. 
Q. And maybe a bookkeeper, office people, or something 
like this? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But all of the work in connection with your homes, 
your home construction itself, is all contracted 
out? 
A. That's correct. 99%. 
Q. And the purpose of this, if you will, Mr. Thorne? 
Do you pay any insurance premiums, for anyone 
that contracts work for you, to the State Insurance 
Fund? 
A. Are you speaking of plumbers and electricians? 
Oe Any craftsman that work on any of your buildings? 
A. I would say no. I have employees that have workmen's 
compensation paid for them, yes. 
Q. All righte 
Now do you withhold taxes, or pay social security 
taxes, on anyone who works in the construction 
area on your homes? 
A. No, I don't. 
9 
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Q. Is it not one of the purposes, to avoid the expense 
of insurance and taxes, that you build in this 
fashion? 
MR. FERRE: I object to that your Honor. 
THE COURT: He may answer. 
MR. SHAUGHNESSY: I think he can answer it. 
A. I would say not. No. Definitely not. 
MR. SHAUGHNESSY: Q. It's not to avoid the expense 
of it? 
A. It's not a consideration at all. 
Q. Then what is the consideration? 
A. The consideration is that it's just a matter of 
liability. I don't what to have to worry about 
keeping a crew of men busy all the time because 
I'm busy for awhile, and they I have nothing for 
them to do. Then I'm busy again, and then have 
nothing for them to do. It is a lot easier to 
find a subcontractor and pay him an exact· figure. 
To know exactly what you have got in to a home, 
and have them take all the responsibility to do 
the home, and to have it done correct. I am not 
an authority in roofing. I am not an authority 
in tile work. It's better to get experts that 
know this. And I would have a million employees 
if I had to hire all those type of people. 
This Court's holding in Young is inapplicable in the 
instant case since defendant did not purposely structure his 
business in such away as to avoid liability. Defendant structures 
his business as he does legitimate, business reasons. 
Several facts which surfaced at the hearing indicate that plaintiff 
was an independant contractor. Plaintiff worked on his own time 
schedule. Indeed, plaintiff worked on defendant's homes for only 
three days in January. Plaintiff employed his own techniques. 
10 
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Moreover, plaintiff hired his own workers on occassion. In Rustler 
Lodge y. Industrial Commission, 562 P.2d 227 (Utah 1977), the 
Supreme Court quoted with approval a prior holding, indicating 
that the ability to hire one's own workers prevented classification 
as "employee" for worker's compensation purposes: 
An independent contractor can employ others to do 
the work and accomplish the contemplated results 
without the consent of the contractee, while an 
employee could not substitute another in his place 
without the consent of the employer. 
,ld. at 228. 
• 
In Plewe Construction Company v. Industrial Commission, 
242 P.2d 561 (Utah 1952), cited by plaintiff, the general contractor 
exercised extensive control over the employees of the independent 
The court in Plewe noted: 
Marshall and Hunt shingled about 58% of the ro~f, 
the Plewe Construction Company having obtained 
others to do the rest of it. When Marshall and 
Hunt reported for work, Mrs Plewe the president 
of the construction company, told them he wanted 
the shingles put on a quarter of an inch apart and 
spaced 5 inches to the weather, that they were to 
split the wide shingles and were to keep straight 
lines by chalking across. Mr. Plewe or his brother 
constantly supervised their work to see that those 
instructions were followed, sometimes requiring 
them to correct their work, particularly in regard 
to putting shingles. 
Mr. Plewe or his brother were at the job all the time 
they were working, looking over the workmen's work 
and directing them when they deemed it necessary, 
and Marshall and Hunt acquiesed and complied with all 
instructions • 
.Id. at 562. 
Clearly, in the instant case, no such control was exer~ 
cised. Defendant did not supervise plaintiff's work (R. 73,74). 
11 
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Indeed, defendant admitted that he did not know enough about 
shingling to supervise the work. (R. 73) Furthermore, Plewe 
Construction is distinguishable from the instant case because 
the workers found to be employees in that case were employees 
of the independent contractor, not independent contractors them-
selves. There is a qualitative difference between determining 
an independent contractor to be an employee and determining that 
the independent contractor's employees are employees. The independent. 
contractor maintains substantial control over his work, his schedule, 
his billing procedures, his techniques, etc. The·employee of 
one employer, working for another, does not retain such control. 
Indeed in his findings of fact the Administrative Law Judge stated: 
Even though the definition of employee is very 
liberal under the law, and it may be so liberal 
that an employee of the applicant might successfully 
claim coverage under Thorne Construction, such 
interpretation cannot be made as to the applicant 
himself. It is very clear that the applicant went 
to work for the defendant as an independent 
contractor, carried out his work as an independent 
contractor and fell and was injured acting as an 
independent contractor. (Emphasis added) (R. 100) 
In Harry L. Young & Sons Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 
538 P.2d 316 (Utah 1975), also cited by plaintiff, this court 
upheld the Commission's finding that the worker was an employee. 
The general contractor, in that case, exercised a much greater 
degree of control over the worker. The court enumerated some 
the of facts upon which it was determined that the general contractor 
exercised sufficient control to declare the worker an employee: 
Before defendant could take a load he had to 
clear with plaintiff supervisor. He was not 
12 
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free to refuse to haul a load, or an oversized 
load. He was obliged to check with the dispatcher 
at points along the route as to his travel and 
time of arrival. He was 'advised' the number of 
miles the truck should operate each month which was 
not advice but more in the nature of a direction. 
The company set a speed limit of 5 miles per hour 
less than the lawful posted speed limit, for 
violation of which defendant was subject to 
penalty; and was in fact penalized for an infraction • 
.id. at 318-319. 
In the instant case, no similar evidence has been estab-
lished. Indeed, most of the evidence demonstrates that the plaintiff 
alone exercised control over his work. Furthermore, Young is 
distinguishable because, in that case, the Supreme Court merely 
upheld the Commission's findings. Here, plaintiff is asking 
the court to reverse the Commission's findings. 
Finally, plaintiff ci~es Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 
P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976), in support of his argument that he was 
an employee entitled to recover worker's compensation benefits. 
In Bambrough, the court found an employee of one employer to 
be an employee of a second employer for worker's compensation 
purposes. Bambrough. involved a fact situation very different 
from the situation in the instant case. In BaDJbrough, the plaintiff's 
original employer entered into a "trip-lease agreement" wit~ 
the defendant whereby the parties agreed that plaintiff, a truck 
driver, would haul a load of wood, belonging to defendant, to 
Denver, Colorado. Before embarking on this trip, plaintiff called 
his original employer concerning certain procedures and was 
instructed, "If that's their procedure, you do it." ~. at 1289. 
The court relied heavily on this relinquishment of control by 
13 
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plaintiff's original employer to find that the plaintiff, injured 
on the trip to Denver, was an employee of the defendant for worker's 
compensation purposes. Bambrough is clearly distinquishable. 
In the instant case, no relinquishment of control is evidenced. 
Furthermore, as in Plewe Construction Company, one must note 
the difference between determining an independent contractor 
(such as plaintiff herein) an employee and finding that an employee 
of one employer (such as plaintiff in Bambrough) is an employee 
of another employer for Worker's Compensation cases. In Bambrough, 
the employee retained no more control .over his work under the 
supervision of the second employer than he did under the supervision 
of his original employer. 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion 
in upholding the findings of the Administrative Law Judge and, 
therefore, this court should uphold that order. The defendant 
did not exercise sufficient control over the plaintiff's work 
to declare the plaintiff an employee entitled to receive worker's 
compensation benefits from the employer defendant or its insurance 
carrier, the State Insurance Fund. Therefore, defendant respectfully 
requests this court to uphold the Order of the Industrial Commission. 
DATED THIS 3Q~ay of September, 1983. 
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BLACK & MOORE 
(' ~ ~. 
BY Q)11Mf:\ J/5). a:z,,4411"1 
SUSAN B. DIANA 
Attorney for Defendant 
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